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Colleen Ryan, Supervisor Document Control Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Phoenix, AZ 85007

Re:

February 6, 2003

Docket No. E-01345A-02-0707

In the matter of the Arizona Public Service Company's Financing Application

Dear Ms. Ryan:

Enclosed for filing in the above-captioned proceeding are the original and nineteen (19) copies of the Sempra Energy Resources and Southwestern Power Group, II Reply Brief on APS's Financing Application, which is the subject of the above-referenced proceeding. Also enclosed are two additional copies to be conformed and returned to our office.

Please let me know if you have any questions, and thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Lawrence V. Robertson, Jr.

enclosures

AFFILIATE OR AFFILIATES

## BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

MARC SPITZER CHAIRMAN	2003 FEB -6 A II:	40 JEFF HATCH-MILLER COMMISSIONER
JIM IRVIN COMMISSIONER WILLIAM A. MUNDELL COMMISSIONER	AZ CORP COMMISSI DOCUMENT CONTR	MIKE GLEASON COMMISSIONER
COMMOSIONER		
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPL	JICATION OF	)
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY FOR		DOCKET NO. E-01345A-02-0707
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Pursuant to the schedule established by the Chief Administrative Law Judge, Sempra Energy Resources and Southwestern Power Group II, L.L.C. ("Sempra/ SWPG") hereby submit their Reply Brief in the above-captioned proceeding.

I.

## INTRODUCTION

In their Initial Brief, Sempra/SWPG discussed (i) the statutory decision-making standards which are both applicable to and dispositive of the Commission's consideration of and action upon Arizona Public Service Company's ("APS") Application in this proceeding; and (ii) the burden of proof required of APS to support its alternative financing authorization requests. Sempra/SWPG also reviewed the evidentiary record in this proceeding within the framework of those decision making standards, and noted that serious questions exist as to whether APS has satisfactorily discharged its probative burden as to each of those standards. In that regard, it was

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noted that unless APS has fulfilled the burden of proof required of it as to each of the five (5) decision-making standards prescribed by A.R.S. § 40-301(C), the Commission does not have the authority to approve APS' financing authorization requests. Sempra/SWPG further noted that given the fact that such requests represent a case of first impression for the Commission, and that the Commission Staff's witness had characterized APS' Application as being "rather unique and unusual" and set "in a very gray area," it was imperative that the Commission proceed cautiously and conservatively in evaluating APS' requests and rendering a decision thereon. Finally, Sempra/SWPG urged the Commission to insure that its decision in this proceeding not have the effect, in any conceivable way, of (i) undercutting the Commission's efforts to facilitate the development of a viable competitive wholesale electric market through the Track "B" process, or (ii) positioning the Commission to prejudge the resolution of issues not before it relating to the possible acquisition and rate-basing by APS of Pinnacle West Energy Corporation's ("PWEC") generation assets.

By means of this reference, Sempra/SWPG incorporate herein by reference the entirety of their Initial Brief as further background for the Commission's analysis. In this Reply Brief, Sempra/SWPG will address certain matters discussed in or relating to Initial Briefs filed by other parties in this proceeding.<sup>3</sup>

Tr. 1003, lines 4-5.

Tr. 999, lines 1-2.

In a number of respects, other parties supporting APS' requests simply adopted certain premises utilized by APS, or adopted by implication data on which APS relied, as opposed to conducting independent studies of their own. Accordingly, in discussing probative issues, Sempra/SWPG will primarily focus on APS' presentation and arguments.

## NATURE AND ORIGIN OF "LIQUIDITY CRISIS" APS SEEKS TO AVERT

Through its financing authorization requests, APS states it seeks to avert a "liquidity crisis" that otherwise "threatens its [parent's] continued financial integrity." [APS Initial Brief, page 1, lines 20-21] Despite its protestations to the contrary, in actuality APS in large measure attributes the origins of this crisis to the Commission's issuance of Decision No. 65154 in the Track "A" proceedings;<sup>4</sup> and it suggests that only by approval of APS' financing authorization requests can the Commission begin 5 to redress the impending financial disaster APS endeavors to portray. Omitted from this drama are two very important events, which must be taken into account in any examination of the merits of APS' proposal.

The first of these events is the fact that it was APS' parent, Pinnacle West Capital Corporation ("PWCC") who decided how the PWEC generation assets were to be financed, and what the maturity dates should be for the financing mode that was selected. There is no suggestion in the record of this proceeding that APS had any role in that decision. Nor is there any suggestion that the Commission was consulted or its guidance sought as to the alternative financing scenarios PWCC and PWEC considered before making a final decision. Rather, it

Ironically, the Track "A" proceeding was instituted in part in response to APS' October, 2001 request for a variance from the Commission's competitive procurement rule, as set forth at A.A.C. R14-2-1606(B).

In reality, although not expressly acknowledged by APS, a second major component in PWCC's contemplated "Recovery Plan" is the anticipated filing by APS within the next few months of an application through which it will seek Commission authorization to rate-base, and perhaps actually acquire, PWEC's generation assets. This proposal is further discussed in Section III below.

The Commission Staff's Initial Brief specifically notes at page 3 that "PWCC chose the maturities on its own accord."

In fact, APS acknowledges in its Initial Brief that it would not have been appropriate to involve APS in such financing decision making. [See page 6, lines 7-10]

appears PWCC made the decision for its own financial gain, and with a view towards avoiding "more expensive and restrictive project financing." [APS Initial Brief, page 6, lines 4-7] However, now that PWCC and PWEC apprehend difficulty in arranging for permanent financing of these generation assets, they look to APS and its creditworthiness to "bail" them out, although there is no evidence in the record to suggest PWCC ever intended to share the benefits of its reduced interim financing costs with APS or its ratepayers.

The second event is the failure of APS (and its unregulated parent and generation affiliate) to avail itself of the Commission's invitation in Decision No. 65154 to file an application seeking approval to acquire PWEC's generation assets. Such an application was to be filed on or before September 15, 2002, if APS desired to pursue that course of action. Had it elected to do so, that matter might have been resolved by now; and, perhaps an entirely different scenario might have unfolded without a purported "liquidity crisis" Instead, APS (and, by implication, its parent) opted to file the Application which is the subject of this proceeding on September 16, 2002, thereby presenting the Commission with a "rather unique and unusual" set of financing authorization requests, and the troubling questions which they raise "in a very gray area."

APS has offered no explanation for its failure to avail itself of the Commission's invitation to file an asset acquisition application by September 15, 2002. Nor, did it seek an extension of the deadline for filing such an application. Moreover, no plausible basis for an explanation of such failure(s) would appear to exist. It is very clear from the record in this proceeding that APS has the financial capacity to issue additional bonds and thus raise the funds by which it could have acquired PWEC's generation assets, without the necessity of an

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accompanying rate increase. Thus, the fact that it could not file a rate increase request under the 1999 Settlement Agreement until this year did not represent either an impediment or a barrier to APS filing an application last year for approval to acquire those assets.

Given the foregoing, it borders on arrogance for APS to belatedly request that the Commission "fix" a perceived problem that is largely a result of the actions of APS' unregulated parent and generation affiliate, and the inaction of APS. This is particularly true where the record is devoid of hard evidence that APS' credit rating will in fact be downgraded if its Application is denied. All that is in the record is the conjecture of APS' witnesses, and conjecture has no probative value or role in this setting.

### III.

## PWCC's PROPOSED "RECOVERY PLAN" AND THE PROVERBIAL "SLIPPERY SLOPE"

In both its evidentiary presentation and its Initial Brief, APS discusses PWCC's proposed "Recovery Plan" for restoring its financial integrity. The "Recovery Plan" is described as consisting of four (4) components: (i) reduction of capital expenditures through the cancellation of Redhawk Units 3 and 4; (ii) issuance of \$200 million in PWCC common equity; (iii) generation of PWCC cash flow through acceleration of Sun Cor real estate sales; and (iv) refinancing of PWCC/ PWEC's Bridge Debt through financial assistance from APS. [See, e.g. APS' Initial Brief, page 5, lines 8-16; Ex. APS-1, pages 12-13; Tr. 90-93; Tr. 113; and Tr. 217-218] In that regard, APS states that

"The authorizations requested in the [Financing] Application are necessary to complete PWCC's 'Recovery Plan'." [APS Initial Brief; page 5, lines 14-16] [emphasis added]

<sup>8</sup> See Decision No. 65154 at page 33, Line. 27- page 34, Line. 6

In reality, that assertion is incorrect.

More specifically, a final and essential component in PWCC's "Recovery Plan" is the contemplated filing by APS of an application "to ratebase the PWEC reliability assets in the Company's upcoming general rate case." [See APS Initial Brief, page 17, lines 3-4] This filing is not identified as an essential feature of PWCC's "Recovery Plan," but in reality it is necessarily so. A four-year loan from APS will not solve PWCC's purported need to arrange permanent financing for PWEC's generation assets. Yet, Condition No. 5 to the Commission Staff's support for the proposed APS Loan is a four-year term limit on the loan, which APS is willing to accept. Although that condition allows for the prospect of an extension of that term with Commission approval, such approval cannot and should not be presumed at this time.

So, how do PWCC and APS overcome the financially inhibiting effect of this term limitation? They do so by means of the contemplated rate-basing of PWEC's generation assets well within that four-year time frame. APS endeavors to suggest that

"Approving the [financing] Application in no way prejudices the Commission's ultimate rate-basing determination regarding any or all of the PWEC Arizona generation [assets]." [APS Initial Brief, page 17, lines 9-11]

However, that suggestion is disingenuous at best. This is because APS' (and PWCC's) plan contains no "exit strategy." Stated differently, what will PWCC and APS do to address PWCC's financial integrity needs four years from now, or sooner, if the Commission (i) grants APS' currently pending Application in this proceeding, and (ii) subsequently denies APS' forthcoming application for rate-basing of PWEC's generation assets?

In supporting approval of APS' Application, subject to APS' prompt filing of an application for rate-basing authorization, the Residential Utility Consumer Office ("RUCO") has implicitly acknowledged this fact.

In reality, APS (and PWCC) are in fact seeking to position the Commission so that it will have no alternative but to approve APS' forthcoming application for rate-basing treatment. Otherwise, the Commission will be confronted with the prospect of having only temporarily and partially addressed PWCC's asserted "liquidity crisis."

Thus, the Commission must carefully consider the full, long-term ramifications of what APS has requested of it by its Application in this proceeding. Given the absence of an "exit strategy" on the part of PWCC (and APS), the Commission is being asked to take that first step upon the "slippery slope" which is of such concern to Sempra/SWPG. At least two potential adverse consequences are foreseeable. First, in approving APS' financing application, the Commission may effectively (albeit unintentionally) have positioned itself to subsequently approve APS' forthcoming application to ratebase PWEC's generation assets. Second, incident to such approval of rate-basing, the Commission may have substantially undercut its efforts to facilitate the development of a viable competitive wholesale electric market in Arizona through the Track "B" process. Either consequence would be incompatible with the "public interest."

## IV.

## APPLICABLE DECISION MAKING STANDARDS AND APS' BURDEN OF PROOF

## A. The Relevant Context of "Lawful Purpose."

A.R.S. §40-301(C) provides as follows:

"The Commission shall not make any order or supplemental order granting any application as provided by this article unless it finds that such issue is <u>for lawful purposes which are</u> within the corporate powers of the applicant, are compatible with the public interest, with sound financial practices, and with the proper performance by the applicant of service as a public service corporation

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and will not impair its ability to perform that service." [emphasis added]

In its Initial Brief, APS contends

"There is no statutory limitation on the phrase 'lawful purpose' in Title 40. Thus, this provision may be presumed to mean what it says – that the Commission must find that the purpose is one that is not <u>unlawful</u>." [APS Initial Brief, page 19, lines 5-7] [emphasis in original]

In making this argument, APS is endeavoring to broaden the factual context in which the statutory phrase "lawful purpose" is to be applied. Unfortunately, for APS, the above-quoted language of A.R.S. §40-301(C) does not support APS' contention. To the contrary, the phrase "for lawful purposes which are" provides that very statutory limitation which APS seeks to escape.

More specifically, as Sempra/SWPG noted in Section III of their Initial Brief

"... the Commission 'shall not make any order' granting any application filed pursuant to A.R.S. §40-301 et. seq, 'unless it finds' that the requested financial authorization satisfied the standards prescribed in A.R.S. §40-301(C). In each instance, the requested authorization must be for a 'lawful purpose' which is also each of the following: (i) '... within the corporate powers of the applicant'; '. . . compatible with the public interest,'; (iii) '... compatible. .. with sound financial practices'; (iv) '... compatible ... with the proper performance by the applicant of service as a public service corporation'; and (v) '... will not impair its ability to perform that service.' If the Commission finds that one or more of these statutory criteria have not been satisfied, it cannot grant the Application pending before it." [Sempra/SWPG Initial Brief, page 6, lines 5-15] [emphasis in original]

Accordingly, APS' assertion that

". . . there is no legal prohibition on APS borrowing or loaning money to an affiliate or any other party, provided that the Commission approves such a transaction in the case of an affiliate. . ." [APS Initial Brief, page 19, lines 9-11]

is both misplaced and irrelevant for purposes of this proceeding. Rather, what is relevant is whether the proposed borrowing and loaning by APS is for a "lawful purpose" directly related to each of the five (5) decision making standards set forth in A.R.S. §40-301(C).

In that regard, Sempra/SWPG believe APS has not demonstrated the requisite relationship as to each of the statutory criteria with clear and convincing evidence.

## B. Within the Corporate Powers

In its Initial Brief, APS selectively quotes from its Articles of Incorporation as to the purposes for which is organized, and concludes that it may transact

"... any or all lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated under Chapter 1 to Title 10, Arizona Revised Statutes. . . 'subject to any limitations or requirements contained in the articles of incorporation. . '." [APS Initial Brief, page 19, lines 15-22]

What APS perhaps inadvertently overlooks is the fact that its own Articles of Incorporation, restated as of May 25, 1988, contain such limiting language. More specifically, the following language appears in Article Second immediately after the "any or all lawful business" phrase upon which APS relies:

"The character of the business which the Corporation intends actually to conduct in the State of Arizona on and for the foreseeable period of after July 1, 1976 is that of a public service corporation within the meaning of Section 2 of Article 15 of the Constitution of Arizona as in effect on July 1, 1976." [emphasis added]

Thus, as Sempra/SWPG noted in their Initial Brief,

"... the broad 'any or all' language set forth in the first 'purposes' paragraph, is modified by the qualifying language of the second paragraph, which is quite specific and limiting as to the intended purposes of the company and the nature of its business, namely, that of a public service corporation. [Sempra/SWPG Initial Brief, page 7, lines 17-19]

In addition, Sempra/SWPG also demonstrated in their Initial Brief that language contained in the Articles of Incorporation of APS' corporate predecessor could not be relied upon for two reasons. First, that language was specifically superseded by APS' 1988 Restated Articles of Incorporation. Second, the factual circumstances surrounding this proceeding would not satisfy the requirements of that 1927 language, even if had not been superseded. [Sempra/SWPG Initial Brief, page 7, line 21-page 8, line 11]

In their Initial Brief, Sempra/SWPG concluded that APS had not met its burden of demonstrating that the requested authorizations would be for lawful purposes which are within its corporate powers and intended corporate purposes. APS has done nothing in its Initial Brief to demonstrate that that conclusion is in error. Nor has any other party who filed an Initial Brief.

## C. <u>Compatible With the Public Interest.</u>

As noted at page 5 in Sempra/SWPG's Initial Brief,

"... it is for the Commission to ultimately determine what constitutes the 'public interest' in the context of A.R.S. §40-301(C) and the circumstances surrounding this proceeding. Similarly, it is the Commission which shall decide whether APS has met its burden of proof that the requested financing authorizations are "compatible with the public interest' in this instance." [emphasis added]

In that regard, APS notes that the term "public interest" in this context has not been defined by either the Arizona legislature or courts. Seeking as much latitude as possible with respect to

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what may be considered in connection an application of that concept, APS cites two New Hampshire cases in its Initial Brief. However, neither of those cases were decided under a statute as specific and directive in nature and context as A.R.S. §40-301(C).<sup>10</sup> Thus, they offer the Commission no meaningful guidance in this instance.

Sempra/SWPG believe that there are two lines of inquiry which the Commission may pursue incident to a determination of whether APS' requested financing authorizations are for a lawful purpose compatible with the "public interest." First, the Commission may consider whether the purposes underlying APS' proposed borrowing and lending, or, alternatively, guarantee, are consistent with its purposes and responsibilities as a public service corporation. Sempra/SWPG believe that they are not.

Second, the Commission may consider whether approval of APS' financing authorization requests for the intended purposes entails a risk that the results would be inconsistent with other "public interest" determinations previously made by the Commission. The Commission's

In Grafton County Electric Light & Power Co. v. State, 94 A. 193 (N.H. 1915) the court described the standard of review of the PUC's actions as follows:

> "The measure by which the matter is to be determined is described by the Legislature as 'the public good.' Laws 1911, c. 164, §13. This is equivalent to a declaration that the proposed action must be one not forbidden by law, and that it must be a thing reasonably to be permitted under all the circumstances of the case."

Clearly, neither of these contains the specific statutory decision making criteria and directive set forth in A.R.S. §40-

In Appeal of Roger Easton, 480 A.2d 88 (NOH. 1984) the court cited the following statutory language in connection with its review of the PUC's decision:

<sup>&</sup>quot;RSA chapter 369 provides, in pertinent part: The proposed issue and sale of securities will be approved by the commission where it finds that the same is consistent with the public good. Such approval shall extend to the amount of the issue authorized and the purpose or purposes to which the securities or the proceeds thereof are to be applied, and shall be subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as the commission may find to be necessary in the public interest. . ."

determination that the development of a viable competitive wholesale electric market in Arizona would be in the "public interest," as reflected in Decision No. 65154 and the currently pending Track "B" proceeding, represents such a determination. As noted above in this Reply Brief, and in their Initial Brief, Sempra/SWPG are concerned that any decision by the Commission in this proceeding not have the effect of either (i) undercutting the Commission's efforts in the Track "B" proceeding, or ii) prejudging APS' forthcoming application for authority to ratebase PWEC's generation assets.

In its in Initial Brief, APS endeavors to assemble an array of reasons why approval of its requests would be compatible with the public interest. Some of these relate to it and its role as a public service corporation. Others do not; they relate only to its unregulated parent and generation affiliate. Another alludes to the prospect of resolution of litigation arising from Track "A" and Decision No. 65154, which has no bearing upon a determination to be made within the context of A.R.S. §40-301(C). Finally, APS blandly concludes that approval of the loan to PWEC "will not adversely affect competitive bidding in Track "B" without an iota of explanation or evidentiary support.

Suffice it to say, for the reasons discussed above, Sempra/SWPG believe APS has not satisfactorily discharged the probative burden required of it as to this statutory decision making standard.

## D. Compatible with Sound Financial Practices.

In the interest of brevity, Sempra/SWPG incorporate herein by reference, the discussion of this statutory decision making standard and the record in this proceeding as set forth in their Initial Brief. [Sempra/SWPG Initial Brief, page 10, line 11- page 11, line 5] The discussion set forth in APS' Initial Brief does not address the fundamental question of whether, for purposes of

301(C).

A.R.S. §40-301(C), it is sound financial practice for a public service corporation to lend money or provide credit support to an unregulated parent or generation affiliate. Staff witness Thornton testified that this was "a very gray area." [Tr. 999, lines 1-2] APS has done nothing to dispel that uncertainty.

## E. <u>Compatible With Proper Performance of Service as A Public Service Corporation.</u>

As APS notes in its Initial Brief, there also is no judicial precedent in Arizona defining this statutory decision making standard. Nor has the Arizona legislature done so. Against this void, APS asserts the proposition that

"Clearly, the protection of APS' creditworthiness should PWCC be downgraded is compatible with such a purpose." [APS Initial Brief, page 21, lines 21-22]

In making this statement, APS cites the testimony of the Commission's Staff witness Thornton. However, APS' reliance is misplaced in this regard.

More specifically, the following exchange occurred during the hearings between APS' attorney and Staff witness Thornton:

- "Q. Just as we talked about the sound financial practices, would you agree that if APS <u>believed</u> that the instant application were necessary to protect its own credit rating, that it would be compatible with its performance as public service corporation?
- A. Yes, I would. [Tr. 1000, lines 6-11]" [emphasis added]

What is relevant, however, for purposes of A.R.S. §40-301(C), is what the Commission believes is compatible with sound financial practice by a public service corporation, not what APS believes. Moreover, only a moment before the above-quoted exchange, the following exchange had occurred between APS' attorney and Staff witness Thornton:

- "Q. . . . Do you think it would have been consistent with sound financial principles for APS to have done nothing about the liquidity situation at its parent company?
- A. Well, actually, we're in a very gray area here. It would be hard to say one way or the other." [Tr. 998, line 22- Tr. 999, line 2] [emphasis added]

This question and answer more closely encompasses the issue before the Commission under this statutory criterion; and Mr. Thornton has indicated the resolution is not clear cut, as APS would like to suggest. Rather, "we're in a very gray area here." The probative burden is on APS to provide the requisite clarity, and it has failed to do so.

APS' second argument in support of its contention that this statutory criterion has been satisfied is that approval of its Application preserves for the Commission the ability to consider rate-basing PWEC's generation assets in the future. In Section III above, Sempra/SWPG have discussed in detail the risks and problems associated with this contention, because of the absence of an "exit strategy" in PWCC's Recovery Plan and the resulting "slippery slope" on which the Commission might be placed by reason of approval of APS' currently pending Application.

More specifically, in this proceeding APS is requesting Commission authorization to borrow \$500 million for the purpose of enabling PWCC and PWEC to replace a portion of the Bridge Debt PWEC incurred in connection with construction of PWEC's generation assets. APS has also announced in this proceeding its intent to file an application in the near future requesting Commission authorization to rate-base (if not acquire) PWEC's generation assets. In that regard, APS has argued that Commission approval of its pending request will preserve the Commission's ability to consider APS' future rate-basing request. In order to approve APS' pending request under the statutory decision making standard here in question, the Commission must find that the purposes of the proposed borrowing and loan are "compatible with [APS']

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proper performance of service as a public service corporation." Given the "big picture" scenario that APS has disclosed, how does the Commission make such a finding in this proceeding without jeopardizing or compromising its ability to independently evaluate (and perhaps reject) APS' rate-basing proposal in the future proceeding? That is both the dilemma it faces, and the beginning of the "slippery slope."

## Will Not Impair Ability to Properly Perform As a Public Service Corporation

In the interest of brevity, Sempra/ SWPG incorporate herein by reference the discussion of this decision making standard set forth at pages 12-13 of their Initial Brief. In its Initial Brief, APS devotes one sentence to a discussion of this standard, and two transcript citations. However, as Sempra/SWPG note in their Initial Brief, because of the fact that APS' own Application acknowledges it may be required to secure the debt it proposes to incur "with a mortgage lien on all or a portion of the Company's assets"

> . APS is simply in <u>no</u> position at this time to demonstrate that approval of its Application might not impair its ability to properly perform its public service obligations at some future date by reason of such action." [Sempra/SWPG Initial Brief, page 12, lines 18-20] [emphasis in original]

Accordingly, Sempra/SWPG submit APS has not satisfactorily discharged its probative burden as to this statutory decision making standard as well.

V.

### CONCLUSION

If the Commission should conclude that APS' Application should be granted as to the borrowing and lending alternative, then Sempra/SWPG believe that the Commission Staff's proposed Conditions 1 through 7, represent a well-intentioned and reasonable attempt to improve upon the difficult situation APS and its unregulated parent have presented to the Commission.

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Further, in the event the Commission should decide to approve APS' Application, with the Commission Staff's recommended conditions, Sempra/SWPG urge the Commission to include in its Opinion and Order language designed to insure that the Commission's decision will not have the effect, in any conceivable way, of (i) undercutting the Commission's efforts to facilitate the development of a viable competitive wholesale electric market through the Track "B" process or (ii) positioning the Commission to prejudge the resolution of issues not before its relating to the possible acquisition and rate-basing by APS of PWEC's generation assets.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of February, 2003.

Theodore E. Roberts Sempra Energy Resources 101 Ash Street, HQ 12-B San Diego, California 92101-3017

and

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